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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
CHARLES F. CONRAD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15922 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 1977). 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of one count of robbery on July 18, 1977, in the sedond 
Judicial District, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding. On August 8, 1977, 
appellant was sentenced to a term of not less than five years 
and which may be for life in the Utah State Prison. Appellant 
was further sentenced to an additional five years because of 
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the use of a gun. The two terms were to run consecutively. 
At the rehearing of appellant's motion for a new 
trial on May 22, 1978, Judge Wahlquist struck the additional 
term of five years for the use of a firearm. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and 
judgments of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On.April 15, 1977, at approximately 7:45p.m., the 
By-Rite Gas Station, 809 28th Street, Ogden, Utah, was robbed 
by a single gunman. Kim Reed, the attendant on duty at the 
time, was commanded at gunpoint to open the till and give 
the assailant the money (Tr. 5) which was later determined to 
be $34.90 (Tr. 9). After the robber had taken the money, he 
forced Reed to walk to the car wash area adjacent to the 
service station, then the robber fled on foot along 28th 
Street (Tr. 10-12). Reed testified that he observed a faded 
oxidized red "Toyota or Datsun" automobile parked in the 
end bay that pulled away from the station down Honroe Street 
just as the robber was fleeing down 28th Street (Tr. 12-13, 
43). Two customers were getting gas at the time of the 
robbery, but when Reed asked one if he had seen the incident t' 
replied he had not. (Tr. 26). 
-?-
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Reed called the police immediately upon returning 
to the gas station office and then continued to wait on 
customers until the officers arrived (Tr. 25). After the 
officers arrived and made an investigation, Reed went to 
police headquarters with Officer Deloy White (Tr. 13). Reed 
was shown 84 "mug shots" of suspect persons and picked out 
appellant's photo claiming, "This [is] the guy that had the 
gun." (Tr. 13-14; R. [2a]). Appellant was subsequently 
arrested and charged with aggravated robbery (R. 1, 8). 
During the investigation and at trial, it was 
learned that the oxidized car belonged to Yolanda Gomez, a 
close friend of appellant's, who had loaned the car to 
appellant that night (Tr. 79-80). It was also learned that 
LeRoy Guiterrez, a friend of appellant's, was with appellant 
on the night in question (Tr. 83-84, 217-218). 
At trial, appellant advanced two alternative 
defenses: first, an 'llibi defense; and second, that the offense 
committed was not aggravated robbery, but a simple till tap. 
As to the first defense, appellant offered six 
witnesses who testified as to appellant's whereabouts from 
5:30 p.m~ until about 9:30 p.m. on April 15, 1977 (Tr. 143-
152; 153-166; 204-214; 214-225; 229-240; 260-268). These 
witnesses did not all place appellant at a single location at 
any one given time and the testimony taken as a whole, is 
-3-
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inconsistent not only with the defense's case itself, but 
also with Yolanda Gomez' testimony who, although she is a 
close friend of appellant's, was called as an adverse witness 
for the prosecution. (Tr. 76-113) . 
The r~ore important of the two defenses was appellant 1 
second claim that the offense was only a class B misdemeanor 
"till tap" theft. Appellant argues that he and Guiterrez 
schemed together to steal from the By-Rite station by creatins 
a distraction in one of the car wash bays (Tr. 279-280). 
They planned to cut a rubber hose on a spray gun in one of the 
wash bays and then ask Reed to come look at the problem 
leaving the station's till unattended (Tr. 282-283). Testimor 
at tr::.e<~ from both Reed and appellant indicates that the two 
did cut the hose and lured Reed from the station -::>ffice (Tr. 
30-31, 363; 282-292). Reed, however, testified that the cut 
hose incident occurred about one-half hour before the aggravat' 
robbery occurred (Tr. 30, 363). 
It was also brought out in Reed's testimony that 
the cash box on the office counter was bolted down and always 
locked (Tr. 22-24). Reed testified that he ah;ays had the 
key on a key ring on his person and never left the key in 
the cash box lock (Tr. 22-24). Reed said this was the case 
on April 15 when he left the office to inspect the damaged 
car wash hose. (Tr. 24). 
-4-
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On several occasions during the trial, Reed 
re-affirmed his claim that appellant, Charles Conrad, did 
indeed hold a pistol on him and demanded money from the 
By-Rite Gas Station cash box. (Tr. 7-8; 57-61; 67; 74; 
362-363). Reed was also positive in his identification 
of appellant, Charles Conrad, as the gunman who committed 
the robbery on April 15, 1977 (Tr. 6; 13-14). 
After both sides had rested,the jury was instructed 
and given four alternative verdicts to return: (l) aggravated 
robbery; (2) robbery; (3) classB misdemeanor theft; or (4) 
acquittal (R. 39-42). After deliberating 46 minutes after a 
three day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 
charge of aggravated robbery (R. 38). 
Prior to trial, appellant moved for a continuance 
in order to have more time to locate LeRoy Guiterrez in order 
to call him as a defense witness (R. 15-17). When the motion 
was denied (R. 21) , the court reserved the right to reconsider 
the motion if all defense witnesses were not served. ~fuen 
the trial and sentencing were completed, appellant moved for 
a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence having 
since located Guiterrez (Tr. 69-71). This motion was also 
denied but the court again reserved the right to reconsider 
if Guiterrez would present himself in court and offered 
whatever further evidence he had on the matter (R. 81). 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant appealed this denial of a new trial to 
the Utah Supreme Court, but upon motion of the defendant, i.t 
1
, 
remanded to the Second District Court for reconsideration 
(R. 468). At the reconsideration hearing, Judge Wahlquist 
determined that since Guiterrez' testimony was inconsistent 
with appellant's alibi defense and also that it would not 
have made a difference in the outcome of the trial, the motion 
for a new trial was denied (R. 478). Also, the additional 
five year term for the use of the firearm was struck by 
Judge \vahlquist at this rehearing (R. 478-480). 
Appellant now appeals that denial of a new trial 
to this court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
REFUSING TO GRANT A NE\'7 TRIAL 
INASHUCH AS APPELLANT'S "NEVi'LY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE" WAS MERELY 
CUMULATIVE, WOULD NOT HAVE CHANGED 
THE RESULT AT TRIAL, AND THERE IS 
NO SHOWING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
About six weeks before trial, appellant filed an 
affidavit with the ;trial court asking for a continuance of 
trial because LeRoy Guiterrez .'!las not available to testify 
(R. 15-17). In fact, Guiterrez was a fugitive from the 1~ 
enforcement officers and was avoiding the police (R. 16). 
-6-
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The motion for continuance was denied (R. 21) with Judge 
Wahlquist reserving judgment as to the importance of any 
witnesses not called to be determined at trial. 
On August 12, 1977, appellant filed an affidavit 
with the court asking for a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence declaring that Guiterrez was then avail-
able to testify. The court denied the motion on September 
27, 1977, but offered to reconsider the motion "if the claimed 
witness appears in court and presents his testimony for the 
record." (R. 81). Appellant then appealed this denial of 
a new trial to this court, and, upon motion of appellant, the 
matter was remitted to the trial court. (See State v. Conrad, 
Remittance, No. 15374, March 31, 1978, (R. 468)). 
At the reconsideration hearing held on May 22, 1978, 
Judge Wahlquist considered the affidavit of Guiterrez's version 
of the incident. The court concluded that the affidavit was 
"absolutely inconsistent \vith the testimony given" by Kim 
Reed and also inconsistent with appellant's alibi defense 
(R. 479-480). Judge Wahlquist ruled: 
"Insofar as the motion is concerned, 
considering the testimony that was given 
from the defense is inconsistent to-tal1ly 
with this testimony now given, that it 
could not intelligently have presented 
both this testimony [admission of corn-
mission of a crime) and the defens~ which 
-7-
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he did present [alibi defense) which 
was defeated. In the total of the 
situation, I do not think this witness 
would have made a difference. For 
that reason, I w1ll deny the motion 
for a new trial." (Emphasis added) 
(R. 478) 
Appellant now claims that this ruling by Judge 
Wahlquist improperly denied him his right to a new trial. 
The statutory requirements for the granting of a new trial 
are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-1 et seq. (1953, as 
amended). Section 78-38-3 outlines the grounds for new trials' 
and subsection 7 deals precisely with the point raised on I 
this appeal: 
"When a verdict or decision has been 
rendered against the defendant the court 
may, ~pon his application, grant a new 
trial in the following cases only: 
* * * 
(7) When new evidence has been 
discovered, material to the defendant 
and which he could not:with reasonable 
diligence have discovered and produced 
at the trial." (Emphasis added). 
Thus, if the newly discovered evidence is not 
material to the defendant or it can be shown that the de-
fendant did not make reasonable efforts to discover the 
evidence before trial, then the new trial will not be granted. 
While this latter requirement was questioned by the state at 
the rehearing (R. 475-476), respondent \vill assume, arguendo, 
-8-
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that appellant did use reasonable diligence in attempting 
to locate Guiterrez before trial. However, the former 
requirement was the gist of Judge %'ahlquist's ruling; that is, 
appellant did not show by the Guiterrez affidavit that the 
evidence was "material to the defendant." 
Appellant notes in his brief that "for some unknown 
reason" the affidavit of Guiterrez is not included in the 
present case's record, but is included in the record of the 
previous appeal. Respondent is unable to locate the alleged 
affidavit to refer this court to in either court records. 
But assuming, arguendo, that it does exist somewhere, Judge 
Wahlquist's rulings are most persuasive. The appellant 
advanced two alternative defenses at trial: (1) an alibi 
defense; and (2) that the committed crime was not a robbery, 
but merely a till tap (class B theft). Thus, the Guiterrez 
affidavit accomplishes two results. First, it completely 
undermines the alibi defense alternative since the affidavit 
admits that Guiterrez and appellant were both at the By-Rite 
gas station on the night in question and at the incriminating 
time. (The alibi defense was also discredited by appellant 
himself when he took the stand and admitted being at the 
By-Rite station and participating in a crime that night 
(Tr. 279-292)). 
-9-
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The affidavit also results in nothing rnore than a 
cumulative restatement of appellant's testimony at trial. 
Appellant admits this in his brief where he states: 
. . the testimony of LeRoy 
Guiterrez is completely supportive of 
the appellant's testimony given in his 
defense at the time of trial." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 6). 
Appellant's admission that the affidavit is only 
"supportive of appellant's testimony" is an admission that the 
evidence is merely cumulative which was precisely the issue 
dealt with in the case of State v. Jiron, 27 Utah 2d 21, 
492 P. 2d 983 (1972). In Jiron, defendant was convicted of 
robbery and he appealed claiming, inter alia, that he should 
be ;ranted a new trial. Defendant based this claim on the 
fact that his wife was in Colorado at the time of his trial 
and therefore could not testify as to his whereabouts on the 
night in question. After trial, defendant's wife swore out 
an affidavit and testified to basically the same story de-
fendant had given at trial. In upholding the trial court's 
denial of a new trial on defendant's claim of newly discovered 
evidence, this court ruled: 
"The wife's testimony is merely 
cumulative to defendant's; 
Finally, the facts recited in the 
affidavit are not of the type that 
would indicate the probability of a 
different result upon the retrial of 
the case. From the foregoing there 
is insufficient basis upon which to 
predicate a determination that the 
trial court abused its discretion." 
492 P. 2d at 985. 
-10-
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Thus, where "new" evidence is only cumulative in its 
effect, the matter is left to the judgment of the trial court 
to determine whether a new trial should be granted. Also 
where, in that judgment, it appears that a new trial would 
result in the same verdict, a new trial motion may properly 
be denied. 
This principle was also advanced by the Utah Court 
in State v. Molitz, 40 Utah 443, 122 P. 86 (1912), and State 
v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P. 2d 167 (1931). The Molitz case 
held that it was proper to deny a motion for a new trial 
where defendant's newly discovered evidence was only cumulative. 
In the present case, Judge Wahlquist's determination 
that Guiterrez's affidavit was merely a further corroboration 
of appellant's own testimony given at trial triggers the ap-
plication of the Jiron and Molitz cases. As above noted, 
these two cases would affirm the denied new trial motion on 
the basis of Guiterrez's affidavit being "merely cumulative." 
Another principle which trial courts must resolve 
is whether the newly discovered evidence would result in a 
different outcome at trial. Several Utah cases hold that a 
new trial can only be granted where such a probability of a 
different result is likely. 
In Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708 
(1916), the court ruled: 
-11-
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"It is only unde~ very special 
circumsta.nces . . that ne1·1 trials 
are granted to allow the defeated party 
to add cumulative evidence, newly 
discovered, and then only where there 
is a clear probability that tre result 
of a new trial will be different." 
(Emphasis added.) 57 P. 2d at 723. 
In accord, State v. Montgomery, 37 Utah 515, 109 
P. 815 (1910); State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P. 2d 
764 (1949); State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77, 513 P. 2d 438 
(1973); and State v. Jiron, supra. 
This is precisely the basis of Judge Wahlquist's 
ruling. He forcefully determined that "[i]n the total of thE 
situation, I do not think this witness [Guiterrez] would ~w 
made a difference." (R. 478). In other words, even had 
3ui~e=rez testified at trial, Judge Wahlquist, who presid~ 
at both the trial and the rehearing of the motion, determine( 
that there was no likelihood that "the result of a new trial 
will be different." Id. 
One final consideration of the granting of new 
trials needs to be dealt with here. The reviewing court wiL 
only reverse a lower court's ruling if an abuse of trial 
court discretion is shown. State v. Harris, supra, is dis-
positive on this point. In considering defendant's appeal 
from a denied motion for a new trial in Harris, this court 
ruled: 
-12-
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"It is a matter solely within the 
discretion of the trial court as to 
whether it should grant a new trial on 
the ground of newlv discovered evidence. 
This court cannot substltute its dis-
cretion for that of the trial court whose 
ruling will be sustained, unless it' is 
clearly indicated that it abused or 
failed to exercise its discretion. The 
denial of such a motion will be deemed 
an abuse of discretion only in such 
instances where there is a grave suspicion 
that justice may have been miscarried 
because of the lack of enlightenment on a 
vital point, which the new evidence will 
supply . . If there be evidence 
before the court upon which reasonable 
men might differ as to whether or not 
the defendant is guilty, the trial court 
may deny a motion for a new trial." 
513 P, 2d at 439-440. (Emphasis added) 
This legal principle regarding trial court discretion 
in the granting of new trials is soundly imbedded in Utah 
case law and has been cited by this Court on numerous occasions. 
(Jensen v. Logan City, supra; Hoser v. Zion's Co-op. Herchantile 
Inst., 114 Utah 58, 197 P. 2d 136 (1948); State v. Cooper, supra; 
Johnson v. Doctorman, 23 Utah 2d 214, 462 P. 2d 169 (1969); 
State v. Jiron, supra; Lee v. Howes, 548 P. 2d 619 (Utah, 1976); 
Smith v. Shreeve, 551 P. 2d 1261 (Utah, 1976) .) 
Thus, appellant's claim that he was improperly 
denied a new trial only has merit if he can show that Judge 
Wahlquist abused his discretion. This appellant has not done 
except to assert such abuse. On the contrary, a careful 
review of the record reveals a very thoughtful and fair treatment 
of appellant's claim of newly discovered evidence. After 
-13-
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examination of such and when viewed in the context of the 
entire case, Judge WahlqGist correctly determined that the 
Guiterrez's affidavit was only cumulative, would not have 
resulted in a different jury verdict and in so concluding 
he did not abuse his discretion. This conclusion is a proper 
application of U.C.A. § 78 -38-3 which, as above noted, restri 
the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discov~~ 
evidence, to such evidence which is "material to the defenda 
Respondent asserts that Judge Wahlquist's ruling 
was proper in light of the above and submits that appellant'' 
request for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence is not justified by the facts of the case. 
POINT II. 
A JURY'S VERDICT MUST NOT BE 
DISTURBED ON APPEl'.L MERELY 
BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON UN-
CORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE 
VICTIM, UNLESS SUCH TESTIMONY 
IS COMPLETELY UNBELIEVEABLE. 
It is a well settled axiom of criminal law in ~~ 
state that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of 
witnesses. (State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P. 2d 
212 (1957)); State v. Estrada, 119 Utah 339, 227 P. 2d 247 
(1951); State v. Moore, lll Utah 458, 183 P. 2d 973 (1947); 
State v. Mills, 530 P. 2d 1272 (Utah, 1975); State v. Romero 
-14-
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554 P. 2d 216 (Utah, 1976); and State v. Hilson, 565 P. 2d 
66 (Utah, 1977)). 
The more narrow question here involves the credibility 
of the victim of the crime, Kim Reed, who gave uncorroborated 
testimony at trial of the events of the robbery (Tr. 1-75). 
Appellant cites the recent case of State v. Middelstadt, 579 
P. 2d 908 (Utah, 1978), which sets out the basis on which a 
reviewing court must deal with uncorroborated evidence. 
"In general, the common-lav; supports 
the contention that a conviction may be 
sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony 
of the victim, and that such evidence is 
not insubstantial simply because the 
testimony is conflicting in some respects. 
As to the quality of the test1mony given, 
it is settled that it must be so improbable 
that it is completely unbelievable before 
it is insufficient to uphold a conviction. 
We do not find that to be the case here." 
(Emphasis added.) 579 P. 2d at 911. 
Appellant claims that Reed's testimony of appellant robbing 
him with two customers present should be categorized in the 
"so improbable that it is completely unbelievable" category. 
Appellant notes that the customers were not asked by Reed 
to tell police what they saw, that, in fact, the customers 
did not even notice a gunman walking away from the gas 
station office, and that Reed continued to wait on customers 
calmly without asking for their assistance. This is a mistaken 
reading of the trial transcript by appellant. 
-15-
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Reed did testify that he asked one customer if he 
sawanything, and the customer answered he only "saw a 
gentleman up there, but that was it" (Tr. 26). Reed also 
testified that it would have been very difficult for the 
customers to have seen the gun in the man's hand since it wa· 
dusk at about 7:45 p.m. and the gas station lights were on 
(Tr. 5, 12), the office windows are at about "chest level' 
(Tr. 180), the bottom half are painted over and the top half 
has lettering painted on them (Tr. 35), and the two customer: 
were 50 to 60 feet away (Tr. 62), getting gas at the pumps 
furthest from the office (Tr. 26). 
As to his waiting on customers after the event 
without requesting their aid, Reed had already asked one 
customer if he saw anything suspicious and was told he had 
not (Tr. 26). Respondent submits that Reed's behavior, ther 
fore, was not unusual--after being told by the customer that 
hadn't seen anything peculiar, he continued to wait on custc 
until the police arrived (Tr. 26). 
No where in the record does any witness testify ~ 
appellant backed out of the office with gun in hand, as ooU 
in appellant's brief (p. 19). Reed testified that after t~ 
robber took the money, the robber commanded him to walk eve 
to the car wash area and they both left the off ice together 
(Tr. 10, 25). 
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Respondent submits that Reed's testimony is not 
"completely unbelievable," as witnessed by the jury's 46 
minute deliberation after a three-day trial and verdict of 
guilty (R. 38). 
In State v. Romero, supra, the Utah court ruled, 
with regard to a reviewing court's weighing the evidence, 
that: 
"This court has long upheld the 
standard that on an appeal from con-
viction the court cannot weigh the 
evidence. . .. Further, this court 
has maintained that its function is 
not to determine guilt or innocence, 
the weight to give conflicting evidence, 
the credibility of witnesses, or the 
weight to be given defendant's testimony. 
'We are concerned only with the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain the convictions by showing 
that the jury would have found beyond 
a reasonable doubt that defendants 
were guilty.'" 554 P. 2d at 218. 
This jury role was also echoed in State v. Mills, 
supra, where this court said: 
"It is the prerogative of the 
jury to judge the weight of the evidence, 
the credibility of witnesses, and the 
facts to be found therefrom." 530 P. 2d at 1272 
And as to the specific evidentiary matter of un-
corroborated testimony, State v. Middlestadt, holds: 
" . . . there is no rule governing 
how many witnesses are needed or that 
the testimony need be corroborated by 
-17-
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other evidence b~fore the trier 
of fact can decide how to determine 
the weight of the testimony." 579 
P. 2d at 911. 
Appellant attempts to discredit the victim Reed's 
testimony by distorting the record and claims that the 
"only believable portion of Reed's testimony is that port~n 
found on page 142 of the record . (p. 19). Respondent 
would only point out that the testimony on page 142 of the 
record (Tr. 58) is an out of context statement made in re-
sponse to the leading questions of defense counsel during 
cross-examination. The actual exchange is quoted below: 
[Mr. Farr) Q. You came back, found 
the cash box was open, and so you called 
the police and reported it, told them 
that the person that had taken it had 
a g·un? 
[Mr. Reed) A. Right. 
* * * 
Q. So you told them about the 
gun and you remembered Freddy Conrad 
because he had just been in there, and 
you later then identified him as the 
person with the gun? 
A. As I stated, it didn't happen 
that way." (Tr. 58; R. 142) 
Thus, where appellant cites to page 142 of the 
record as the only portion of the trial where Reed was 
believable, respondent answers that defense counsel, in an 
attempt to confuse and have Reed contradict his earlier stoq, 
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offered defendant's version of the incident in question 
form. Reed answered "Right" to the portion of the question 
dealing with the gun being used, but then one question later, 
refuses to go along with defense counsel's leading questions 
and re-asserts his earlier position. This is hardly an 
admission that defendant's story was at that point adopted 
by Reed or that Reed was only believable when he replied 
"right" to a multi-faceted, leading question. 
Respondent contends that the above authority, when 
applied to an accurate reading of the trial record, leads 
to only one conclusion: the uncorroborated testimony of Kim 
Reed was sufficient, substantial and believable. The jury 
was, therefore, within its prerogative when it determined 
appellant's guilt. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's claim of an improper denial of a 
new trial is not supportable since the Guiterrez affidavit 
was merely cumulative evidence, would not have resulted in 
a different jury verdict and there is no showing of any 
abuse of discretion by the trial court in its rulino. 
The uncorroborated testimony of Kim Reed is not 
Qer se a deficient form of evidence and can onlv be deemed 
insufficient where the court finds the testimnn~ tn hA 
"completely unbelievable." The iury's verdict which relied 
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on Reed's testimony is therefore a proper one since a careful 
review of the trial record shows that the testimony was 
sufficiently believable. 
On the basis of the above authority and the 
evidence against appellant shown at trial, respondent prays 
the verdict and sentence be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
"liLLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
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